Although democratic institutions existed long before gender equality, at this point in history, growing emphasis on gender equality is a central component of the process of democratization.
Part I of this article briefly reviews the relationship between culture and women's representation, and demonstrates the linkage between democratization and the proportion of women in parliaments in 65 societies worldwide. Part II examines the reasons for this relationship, including the role of changing values towards gender equality, the process of modernization and economic development, cultural legacies represented by religious values, and democratic political institutions.
Part III demonstrates that growing support for gender equality in public life represents part of a broader shift towards expressive values, linked with the rise of postindustrial society. Part IV considers the implications of these findings, arguing that the process of modernization drives cultural change, which in turn leads to the rise of women in public life and the development of democratic institutions.
I: Cultural Barriers to Women's Representation
Many factors help shape the structure of opportunities for women's representation in elected office, including the institutional context and the resources that women and men bring to the pursuit of legislative careers (Rule 1987; Norris 1997; Karam 1998; Kenworthy and Malami 1999; Caul 1999; Reynolds 1999) . In addition to these factors, traditional cultural attitudes have long been thought to present major barriers to women's representation in elected office, but previous studies have not present conclusive empirical evidence supporting this proposition. Theories of socialization have long emphasized the importance of the division of sex roles within a country --especially egalitarian attitudes towards women as political leaders (Sapiro 1983; Carroll 1994) . Cultural explanations hypothesize that in traditional societies, women will be reluctant to run and, if they seek the office, will fail to attract sufficient support to win. Cultural attitudes may have a direct influence on whether women are prepared come forward as candidates for office (the supply-side of the equation), and the criteria used by gate-keepers when evaluating suitable candidates (the demand-side), as well as having gendemoc.docan indirect influence upon the overall institutional context, such as the adoption of gender quotas in party recruitment processes (Lovenduski and Norris 1993; Norris 1997 ).
The cultural hypothesis provides a plausible explanation of why women in elected office have advanced much further in some democracies than others. For example, women attained leadership roles much earlier and much more extensively within the Nordic region than in such countries as France or Belgium, despite the fact that all of these countries are affluent European post-industrial welfare states, and established parliamentary democracies with similar proportional representation electoral systems (Karvonen and Selle 1995) . Cultural differences also help explain why countries with a strict Islamic background--even the more affluent ones--consistently tend to fall toward the bottom of worldwide rankings of the percentage of women in parliament (Abu-Zayd 1998) . Studies of post-industrial societies have found that the proportion of women in parliament is negatively associated with the historical prevalence of Catholicism, which seems to encourage more traditional attitudes towards women and the family than does a Protestant heritage (Rule 1987; Kenworthy and Malami 1999) . But a broader comparison of 180 nation states by Reynolds (1999) found that on a worldwide scale, the greatest contrasts were between traditionally Christian countries (whether Protestant or Catholic) and all other religions including the Islamic, Buddhist, Confucian and Hindu faiths, all of which had lower proportions of women in legislative and Cabinet office. Consequently, cultural factors have been suspected to be an important determinant of women's entry into elected office, but previous studies have been unable to test this proposition against comparable survey evidence of attitudes towards women across a wide range of nations.
This article hypothesizes that the process of modernization leads to both democratization and a rise in the proportion of women in public life. It is well known that industrialization leads to occupational specialization, rising educational levels, and increasing levels of income. But economic gendemoc.doc Page 4 of 33development also brings unforeseen cultural changes that transform gender roles and make the emergence of democratic institutions increasingly likely. Determined elites can resist these changes, and a society's institutions and cultural traditions can facilitate or retard them, but in the long run, the underlying trend toward both gender equality and democratization becomes increasingly costly to resist. Evidence from more than 60 societies suggests that economic development propels societies in a roughly predictable direction, changing prevailing gender roles in virtually any society that industrializes.
One indication that gender equality goes with democracy is the fact that democratic societies usually have more women in parliament than undemocratic societies. Figure 1 shows the relationship between a society's level of civil rights and political liberties, and the percentage of women in the lower house of parliament 1 . This figure includes 65 societies containing 80 percent of the world's population 2 . Countries that rank high on civil rights and political liberties, have much higher proportions of women in parliament than countries with low levels of freedom. A few authoritarian societies, such as China, have large numbers of women in parliament; while Japan, Ireland, France and the U.S. have high levels of democracy and relatively few women in parliament. But despite these exceptions, the overall relationship is strong, showing a .65 correlation. In democratic societies, women tend to be relatively well represented in parliament.
( Figure 1 about here)
II: Explaining the Relationship between Gender Equality and Democratization
Why does gender equality in elected office tend to go with democracy? A key cultural change involves the belief that men make better political leaders than women. This view is still held by a majority of the world's population, but it seems to be fading rapidly in advanced industrial societies.
Evidence from the World Values Surveys demonstrates that in less-prosperous countries such as India, gendemoc.doc Page 5 of 33
China, Brazil, Pakistan, Nigeria or Egypt, from 50 to 90 percent of the public still believes that men make better political leaders than women (see Figure 2 ). But in advanced industrial societies, an overwhelming majority of the public rejects this idea. Furthermore, we find large generational differences in advanced industrial societies, where older citizens are relatively likely to believe that men make better political leaders than women, but younger citizens (especially younger women) overwhelmingly disagree. The long-standing belief that "men make better political leaders than women" is changing, as younger generations replace older ones.
(Figure 2 about here)
This belief is not just a matter of lip service. It has important political consequences. As Figure 2 demonstrates, in countries where the public rejects the idea that men make better political leaders, relatively high proportions of women get elected to parliament. This relationship is substantially stronger than the one shown in Figure 1 (the correlation rises from .65 to .77). This suggests that cultural norms may have even more impact than democratic institutions, on the percentage of women in parliament. Moreover, although richer countries have higher proportions of women in parliament than poorer ones, this may be true mainly because economic development leads to cultural changes. Table 1 tests these claims, examining the relative impact of cultural factors, economic modernization and democratic institutions on the percentage of women in parliament.
( (Rule 1987; Reynolds 1999) . We constructed a dummy variable that taps whether or not the society was historically dominated by Protestantism (regardless of how many practicing Protestants it has today); this variable alone explains 46 percent of the variance in the proportion of women in parliament-substantially more than all three modernization factors combined (model 3). Although most historically Protestant societies have higher proportions of women in parliament than historically Roman Catholic ones, Catholic societies generally rank above societies with Orthodox or Confucian or Islamic cultural traditions. Among the societies included in this study, in the median-ranking Protestant society 30 per cent of the members of the lower house were women; in the median Catholic society the figure was 13 percent; in the median Orthodox society it was 7 percent, in the median Confucian society it was 5 percent, and in the median Islamic society, only 3 percent of the members of the lower house were women. Even today, a society's cultural heritage has a surprisingly strong impact on gender equality. Societies with a Protestant heritage have about ten times as many women in parliament as do societies with an Islamic heritage. Now let us examine the impact of another type of cultural variable: the extent to which the public believes that "men make better political leaders than women." While the religious traditions were established centuries ago, the norm of gender equality has become widespread only within recent decades. As Figure 2 demonstrates, this belief is strongly linked with the proportion of women in parliament. But does it have an impact of its own, or is it simply one more consequence of economic modernization, along with rising female representation in parliament? Model 4 analyzes the impact of belief in gender equality, while controlling for levels of economic development and religious heritage.
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The proportion of explained variance rises steeply when we add this variable, rising from .46 in model 3, to .70 in model 4. The extent to which the public endorses the norm of gender equality seems to have a major impact on the percentage of women in parliament. The society's religious tradition also has a powerful effect. Both a society's religion and the degree to which people believe that men make better political leaders, show statistically significant effects on the percentage of women in parliament--but GDP/capita does not show a significant relationship when we control for them. Economic development seems to be important mainly in so far as it is helps change prevailing gender norms: by itself, it has little direct effect.
Finally, let us examine the impact of democratic institutions on the percentage of women in parliament. Figure 1 showed that the two are closely linked-but why do they go together? Is it (1) because democratic institutions themselves tend to produce higher proportions of women in parliament, or (2) because of underlying cultural changes that bring rising female participation in parliament, and also favor democracy? Model 5 adds a measure of democracy to the analysis, the Freedom House ratings of political rights and civil liberties. 2 The results indicate that cultural factors drive the process.
A society's level of democracy does not have a statistically significant effect on the percentage of women in parliament, when we control for them, and the proportion of explained variance rises only slightly (from .70 to .72) when we take democratic institutions into account. Cultural changes seem to bring rising female representation in parliament regardless of whether or not democratization occurs.
Accordingly, when we drop the Freedom House democracy ratings and GDP/capita from the analysis Democratic institutions, by themselves, do not guarantee gender equality. But does it work the other way around: does rising emphasis on gender equality improve the chances that democratic institutions will emerge and flourish? The answer seems to be yes. Figure 3 shows the relationship between support for gender equality in politics, and the society's level of political rights and civil liberties. The relationship is remarkably strong. Although the linkage between the percentage of women in parliament and democracy (shown in Figure 1 ) was a substantial .65, the linkage between support for gender equality and democracy is much stronger (r=.82). In virtually every authoritarian society, a majority of the public believes that men make better political leaders than women; in virtually every stable democracy, a clear majority of the public rejects this belief (Japan being the sole exception). This correlation could be taken to mean that 67 percent of the variance in levels of democracy reflects emphasis on gender equality. The reality is not that simple, of course. Growing support for gender equality is only one aspect of a broader process of cultural change that is transforming advanced industrial societies and contributing to democratization, as the multivariate
analyses presented below will demonstrate. But attitudes toward gender equality are a central element-arguably, even, the most central element--of this cultural change. Let us examine this broader syndrome of cultural change, using data from the World Values Surveys.
III: Gender Equality and Cultural Change
In a factor analysis of national-level data from the 43 societies included in the 1990 World
Values Survey, Inglehart (1997) found that two main dimensions accounted for over half of the crossnational variance in more than a score of variables tapping basic values in a wide range of domains gendemoc.doc Page 11 of 33ranging from politics to economic life and sexual behavior. Each of the two dimensions taps a major axis of cross-cultural variation involving many different basic values; the first dimension taps a dimension referred to as "Traditional vs. Secular-rational values," while the second one taps "Survival vs. Self-expression values."
These two dimensions of cross-cultural variation seem robust. When the 1990-1991 factor analysis was replicated with the data from the 1995-1998 surveys, the same two dimensions of crosscultural variation emerged from as from the earlier surveys-even though the new analysis was based on surveys that covered 23 additional countries that were not included in the earlier surveys (Inglehart and Baker, 2000) . Inglehart and Baker (2000) provide full details on how these dimensions were measured, together with factor analyses at both the individual level and the national level, demonstrating that the same dimensional structure emerges at both levels.
The Traditional/Secular-rational values dimension reflects the contrast between societies in which religion is very important and those in which it is not. A wide range of other orientations are closely linked with this dimension. Societies near the traditional pole emphasize the importance of parent-child ties and deference to authority, along with absolute standards and traditional family values, and reject divorce, abortion, euthanasia, and suicide. These societies have high levels of national pride, and a nationalistic outlook. Societies with secular-rational values have the opposite preferences on all of these topics.
( Figure 4 about here) Figure 4 shows where each of 70 societies, containing most of the world's population, is located on these two dimensions, providing a cultural map of the world. 3 We find large and pervasive differences between the worldviews of people in rich and poor societies; their basic values and beliefs differ on scores of key variables, in a coherent pattern. Richer societies tend to be high on both of gendemoc.doc Page 12 of 33these two dimensions, while low-income societies tend to rank low on both dimensions. Does this mean that economic development brings predictable changes in prevailing values? The evidence suggests that it does: time series evidence shows that with economic development, societies tend to move from the lower left of Figure 4 , toward the upper right-from the values prevailing in lowincome societies, toward the values prevailing in high-income societies (Inglehart and Baker, 2000) . systems that persist when one controls for the effects of economic development (Inglehart and Baker, 2000) . A society's culture reflects its entire historical heritage, including religious traditions, colonial ties, the experience of communist rule and its level of economic development.
( shift from emphasis on economic and physical security, toward increasing emphasis on selfexpression, subjective well-being and quality of life concerns (Inglehart, 1990 (Inglehart, , 1997 These are important issues. But arguably, the most important social change of the past few decades has been the revolution in gender roles that has transformed the lives of a majority of the population throughout advanced industrial society. Since the dawn of recorded history, women have been narrowly restricted to the roles of wife and mother, with few other options. In recent decades, this has changed dramatically. Several of the items in Table 2 (shown in bold face type) involve the role of women: the survival/self-expression dimension reflects mass polarization over such questions as whether "A woman has to have children to be fulfilled;" or whether "When jobs are scarce, men have more right to a job than women;" or whether "A university education is more important for a boy than a girl." But one item taps this dimension particularly well: the question whether "Men make better political leaders than women."
Responses to this question are very strongly correlated with the survival/self-expression dimension-indeed, they are almost as strongly correlated with it as is the Materialist/Postmaterialist values battery. This is remarkable, because Materialist/Postmaterialist values are measured by a multiitem battery that was explicitly designed to tap intergenerational value change and is one of the items used in the factor analyses that define this dimension. The question about whether men make better political leaders than women, on the other hand, is a single item that was not included in the first two waves of the World Values Surveys, and consequently was not used in the analyses that define this dimension. It nevertheless taps the survival/self-expression almost as well as does the 
IV. Gender equality and democracy
These same cultural changes seem to be closely linked with the rapid spread of democratic institutions that has occurred in the last two decades. The syndrome of survival/self-expression values shown in Table 2 were true, it would provide a powerful argument for democracy, implying that we have a quick fix for most of the world's problems: adopt democratic institutions and live happily ever after.
Unfortunately, the experience of the Soviet Union's successor states doesn't support this interpretation. Since their dramatic move toward democracy in 1991, they have not become healthier, happier, more trusting, more tolerant or more Postmaterialist: most of them have moved in exactly the opposite direction. The fact that their people are living in economic and physical insecurity, seems to have more impact than the fact that their leaders are chosen by free elections.
Democratic institutions do not automatically produce a culture that emphasizes self-expression values. Instead, it seems that economic development gradually leads to social and cultural changes that make democratic institutions more likely to survive and flourish. That would help explain why gendemoc.doc Page 20 of 33mass democracy did not emerge until a relatively recent point in history, and why, even now, it is most likely to be found in economically more developed countries-in particular, those that emphasize selfexpression values over survival values.
( Table 3 about here) Table 3 examines the factors linked with the emergence and survival of democracy. We hypothesize that economic development tends to bring a gradual shift from survival to self-expression values, and these values in turn are conducive to democracy. An extensive literature argues that economic development is conducive to democracy, and empirical research has demonstrated repeatedly that richer societies and "post industrial" societies (those with a relatively large percentage of the work force in the service sector) are likelier to have democratic institutions than poorer, largely agrarian or industrial, societies (Lipset, 1959, etc.) . Moreover, there is strong evidence that the causal connection works primarily from economics to politics: although economic development leads to democracy, democracy is not necessarily conducive to economic development (Burkhardt and LewisBeck, 1994; Przeworski and Limogi, 1993) . Model 1 is consistent with this interpretation: relatively high levels of real per capita GDP have a positive and statistically significant impact on a society's level of democracy, as indicated by the Freedom House scores on civil liberties and political rights.
But cultural factors also seem to play significant roles, even controlling for the effects of the survival/self-expression dimension: the proportion of women in parliament is not a direct cause of democracy. Accordingly, when we drop this variable (Model 2), the remaining factors still explain fully 78 percent of the variance in levels of democracy.
A society's traditional religious heritage seems to influence its level of democracy, but these religious traditions were established long ago. We believe their influence today largely reflects the extent to which they help shape a society's position on the survival/self-expression dimension. Theoretically, economic development is the key driving force behind democratization, but its impact is felt mainly in so far as it leads to a shift from survival to self-expression values. Accordingly, Model 5 drops GDP/capita from the regression equation-and a society's position on the survival/self-expression continuum by itself still explains fully 64 percent of the variance in levels of democracy. Democratization seems to be a multi-stage process in which the shift from survival to self-expression values plays the central role, but a society's religious heritage, the structure of its work force and its level of economic development all have some direct impact.
gendemoc.doc (Table 4 about here) Survival/self-expression values are strongly correlated with a society's level of development, as Figure 5 demonstrates. And the multivariate analysis just performed suggests that the shift from survival to self-expression values has a significant causal impact on democracy, one that persists when we control for economic modernization and cultural heritage. But we still need to consider the question, is culture causing democracy, or does democracy transform culture? The relationship could, conceivably, work in both directions, but according to our theory the main effect is one that moves from (1) economic development to (2) culture, to (3) political institutions, with economic development bringing cultural changes that are conducive to democracy. In order to test this hypothesis, we carried out another set of regression analyses-this time, using survival/self-expression values as the dependent variable. The results in Table 3 indicate that self-expression values are conducive to democracy. The analyses in Table 4 There is no question that the two religious indicators are historically and causally prior to democracy: it would be absurd to argue that a given society became Protestant or Orthodox several hundred years ago because it became democratic in the 20 th century. So any overlapping causal gendemoc.doc (Burkhardt and Lewis-Beck, 1994; Przeworski and Limogi, 1993) points to the conclusion that economic democracy is conducive to democratization, but that it doesn't necessarily work the other way around: economic development also seems to have a prior causal status, in relation to democracy. Accordingly, when we drop the level of democracy from the regression, in Model 3, we find that our indicators of economic development and religious heritage account for almost as much of the variance in self-expression values, as is explained in Model 2: the explained variance drops from 86 percent to 83 percent. Although democracy is very strongly correlated with self-expression values, in itself, it seems to account for only 3 percent of the variance in these values. In short, we find indications of a modest reciprocal effect in which democratic institutions help reshape culture, but the main causal sequence seems to be one that starts from the society's traditional cultural heritage, which is then transformed by economic development into relatively high or low levels of emphasis on selfexpression values-which, in turn, helps shape the emergence and survival of democracy.
V. Conclusions: Changing Values and Changing Gender Roles
We have examined the impact of economic and cultural variables on the proportion of women in parliament, and on a society's level of democracy. Although gender equality in parliament is closely linked with democracy (r = .65), neither variable seems to be a direct cause of the other.
Instead, both women's representation in parliament and a society's level of democracy seem to reflect an underlying cultural shift linked with economic development. Although a given society's traditional cultural heritage continues to have significant impacts on both the percentage of women in its parliament, and its level of political rights and civil liberties, rising levels of GDP and the shift toward a knowledge economy tend to transform societies in a predictable direction. They do so largely by gendemoc.docproducing a cultural shift from survival values toward increasing emphasis on self-expression values.
Multivariate analyses indicate that this cultural shift is the main direct cause of both rising proportions of women in parliament, and of higher levels of democracy. A society's traditional cultural heritage and its level of economic development also influence its levels of gender equality and democracy, but their main effect seems depend on the extent to which they contribute to, or resist, the shift toward self-expression values. In regard to democratic institutions, for example, 65 percent of the variance can be attributed to the shift toward self-expression values; economic development and cultural heritage also show some direct effects, but they explain relatively modest amounts of variance (5 percent and 6 percent, respectively). In advanced industrial society, authority patterns seem to be shifting from the traditional hierarchical style toward a more collegial style that parallels the differences between stereotypically "male" and "female" styles of social interaction. While men are relatively likely to emphasize competition, women tend to emphasize cooperation; and while men tend to stress domination, women tend to have a more supportive leadership style. For reasons that are deeply rooted in the nature of advanced industrial society, the "female" leadership style tends to be more effective in these societies than the hierarchical, bureaucratic (and masculine) style that prevailed in agrarian and industrial 3. The indicator of democracy used in this figure is based on the sum of the Freedom House scores from 1981 to 1998, in order to reflect stable democracy, and not just the momentary surge or decline that may occur from one year to the next. These scores are given reversed polarity, so that high scores indicate high levels of democracy. The data in this figure are based on the latest available survey for each society. It should be noted that female representation is one of the many criteria used by Freedom House when establishing their measures of political rights and civil liberties. To avoid dropping an entire society from our analysis when one of these variables is not available, the nation-level aggregate dataset sometimes uses results from another survey in the same country. Data for Egypt, Ghana, Iran and Jordan are from small pilot surveys, and these estimates cannot be considered reliable. Because African and Islamic societies are of great theoretical interest here, but these societies are seriously underrepresented in the World Values Survey, we examine these data nevertheless; we suspect that these results are at least in the right ball park. The data from these surveys are available from the ICPSR survey data archive.
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